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What Consensus? Ideology, Politics and Elections Still Matter
Steven C. Salop 1
Abstract
This article, which was prepared for an ABA Antitrust Section Panel, discusses the role of ideology
and politics in antitrust enforcement and the impact of elections in the last twenty year on
enforcement and policy at the federal antitrust agencies. The article explains the differences in
antitrust ideologies and their impact on policy preferences. The article then uses a database of civil
non-merger complaints by the DOJ and FTC over the last three Presidential administrations to
analyze changes in the number, type and other characteristics of antitrust enforcement. It also
discusses change in vertical merger enforcement and other antirust policies such as amicus briefs,
reports and guidelines. The article concludes that elections do matter and that the impact of elections
on the DOJ and FTC has differed significantly.

I.

Introduction
In his provocative article, Theodore Voorhees asks what role politics plays in contemporary

American antitrust.2 At first glance, the answer would seem to be a simple Yes. After all, the antitrust
laws are promulgated by Congress. Antitrust legal standards can be characterized as reflecting a
“political bargain” among the affected constituencies. 3 Political power no doubt had a major role in the
legislation to grant the thirty or so statutory antitrust exemptions identified by the Antitrust
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For example, see Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2006);
Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to
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Modernization Commission. 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court is an inherently political body in that it uses
majority rule, where outcomes are subject to the usual indeterminacy created by the Arrow
Impossibility Theorem and agenda control. 5 Congress and the President have the opportunity to
appoint judges, DOJ AAGs and FTC Commissioners. Congress also has the ability to grill FTC and DOJ
AAG nominees on their views. They also have the ability to inflict pressure on the agencies in particular
cases, whether based on their own antitrust philosophy or on behalf of constituents, campaign donors
or political allies.
Despite these various pressure points, Voorhees asks whether the common law model, life tenure
for judges and the rise of economics might have trumped politics. He suggests that there is more of a
consensus today. These are interesting hypotheses. Perhaps there are no longer any significant
political issues over which there is conflict. Perhaps antitrust has become a purely economic exercise of
using facts and quantitative evidence to determine the likely effects of allegedly anticompetitive
conduct on consumer welfare. Using Chief Justice Roberts’ analogy, maybe antitrust enforcement has
become simply a matter of calling balls and strikes with the aid of objective economic evidence.
This raises a number of questions. Is there evidence that political pressure has any effect on
enforcement? Do elections still even have significant effects? Is there consensus among economists or
do politics and ideology matter to economists too? This article discusses these issues. Following
Voorhees’ approach, this article focuses particularly on Section 2 and other civil litigation involving
exclusionary conduct, although other areas also are covered.
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My conclusion on the impact of elections is clear. Elections have mattered. Comparing the G.W.
Bush DOJ to the Clinton and Obama DOJ, the Bush administration brought many fewer civil non-merger
complaints. As for ideological focus, its enforcement record on exclusionary conduct under Section 2,
Section 1 and vertical mergers was minimal. In all these dimensions, it also was less aggressive than the
bipartisan FTC. The DOJ also demonstrated risk aversion by focusing more of its efforts on smaller firms
and avoiding litigation, even to the point of accepting two non-binding voluntary settlements. It began
by settling the Microsoft case with a weak remedy and ended with the Section 2 report. It sided with
the defense side at the Supreme Court in almost every matter in a series of cases that led to more
permissive antitrust standards, particularly with respect to exclusionary conduct. While the Obama DOJ
has reversed direction, it has not even nearly regained the momentum of the Clinton DOJ. Whether it
will do so in the second term or not, and whether a failure to do so is the result of recent Supreme Court
decisions, still remains to be seen.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section II discusses the role of ideology in
antitrust policy and the fact that even economists have not reached consensus. Section III addresses the
issue of whether and how elections matter. This section analyzes DOJ civil non-merger complaints in
detail, comparing the number, type and characteristics of enforcement over time and in comparison to
the FTC. This section also examines other policy activities such as amicus briefs, guidelines and reports,
and the Microsoft settlement. Section IV provides some notable examples of political pressure by
Congress and the President on the Court and the agencies and their impact on antitrust doctrine.
Section V concludes. The Appendix lists and classifies the DOJ non-merger civil enforcement complaints
in the last 20 years.
II.

The Role of Ideology
Partisan politics is less of a driving force in antitrust today than is ideology. By ideology, I mean the

political and economic philosophy and experience that frames one’s preferred enforcement policy and
3

antitrust legal standards. This use of the term ideology is not intended to be pejorative. In fact, political
is the more pejorative term because politics involves behavior that may be inconsistent with one’s
philosophy. Ideological differences can lead enforcers and courts to diverge systematically in their
conclusions drawn from a given set of facts. The differences also might suggest disparities in the type of
evidence deemed most relevant.
To return to the analogy of a baseball umpire, judges and commentators may not all use the same
strike zone when calling balls and strikes. Their strike zones may vary because they may have differing
views on the relative harms to the integrity of game from erroneous strikeouts and walks, the
importance of avoiding players being beaned, and fan enjoyment from a pitching duel versus a high
scoring home run derby.
Antitrust law and policy are characterized by clear differences in enforcement ideology among
scholars, enforcers, commentators and courts. Former Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia obviously do
not share the same view of the proper role of antitrust in the U.S. economy. The same is true for AAGs,
FTC Commissioners and academics who are associated with the different “schools” of antitrust. For
example, while we are both economists, Commissioner Joshua Wright and I have different ideological
starting points and often disagree about cases, even when we agree on the basic facts.
There are various ways to characterize these ideological differences about the economic
foundations of antitrust policy. The differences might be distilled down as follows. Chicago-school
conservatives believe that markets are generally self-correcting. They believe that markets self-correct
because entry almost always tends to eliminate monopoly power and collusion is very difficult to sustain
in the face of incentives to defect. They also believe that industrial organization theory and factual
analysis are sufficiently complex that decision making by lay juries and generalist judges is prone to
error. Some also are concerned that jurors are biased against large companies and innovative business
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strategies. For these reasons, they are more concerned about false positives and over-deterrence than
false negatives and under-deterrence. 6
In contrast, liberals have less confidence in market self-correction. They believe that natural
and strategically erected barriers to entry can deter market correction, and that empirical evidence
suggests that cartels and tacit coordination are more stable in practice than some conservatives might
expect. Liberals also place more weight on income distribution. They fear that even conduct that leads
to efficiencies can often harm consumers, particularly lower and middle income consumers. Liberals
also have a greater confidence that actions by the various arms of government can improve the both
efficiency and consumer welfare. They believe that courts are no longer prone to the biases of the past.
For all these reasons, they are relatively more concerned about false negatives and under-deterrence
than are conservatives.
The differences in antitrust ideology cuts most sharply with respect to monopolization and
exclusionary conduct more generally. Section 2 other and exclusionary conduct complaints attack the
firms who were “winners” in the market, and the cases often are arise from complaints by the “losers.”
The winners often are the more efficient firms. Some argue that jurors are biased towards large firms
and identify with the victims.
These differences in antitrust ideology sometimes may flow from broader differences in the two
philosophical groups’ respective concerns about economic liberty. 7 Liberals seem most concerned
about providing the people with protection from the powerful, and so see the state as a way to provide
that protection. In contrast, conservatives seem most concerned about protection from the state itself
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with market activities is harmful to freedom.” George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School
Tradition, 6 J. Competition Law & Economics 1 (2009).
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and place more trust in private contracting. 8 In a sense, this is a clash between the Coasian and
Hobbesian views of the world. 9 Conservatives see laissez-faire markets as enhancing economic liberty
and economic efficiency by facilitating private cooperation and are willing to accept the economic
inequality that may come with it. In contrast, Liberals see laissez-faire markets as involving highly
asymmetric bargaining power and inefficient strategic behavior, leading to entrenchment of economic
power and exploitation of the weak.
While these differences involve ideology, not partisan politics, they clearly can lead to a political
spin. For example, in an important recent article, George Priest explains that the law and economics
movement at University of Chicago “derived from what might be called a deeply held belief system that
political interference in market activities interfered with freedom and reduced societal welfare.” 10 In his
view, the underlying goal of the Chicago-school antitrust program was partially to advance the science,
but “more centrally, it was to ridicule the grounds upon which courts interfered with the
marketplace.” 11 In this regard, Priest makes the point that “the political or ideological dimension of the
Coase Theorem is often ignored.” 12 Indeed, “Coase’s ambition was to deflate arguments for more
intrusive government, not – as it happened – to revolutionize our understanding of the legal system.” 13
These conflicts between liberal and conservative ideologies are played out across the entire
range of economic regulation, including telecommunications, financial markets and transportation.
They also play out in various aspects of antitrust law and policy. To illustrate, there has been an ongoing
controversy over the whether the goal of an economics-based antitrust is or should be total welfare
8
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(i.e., efficiency) or consumer welfare. 14 While it is an oversimplification, I believe that conservatives
tend to favor the total welfare standard while liberals tend to favor the consumer welfare standard. The
justifications given by particular commentators for their favored standard may vary, but the general
tendency remains.
Jonathan Baker’s analysis of the “political bargain” is an example. He suggests that economic
regulatory policy, including antitrust law, has tended towards the center, balancing the goal of achieving
efficiencies with a concern with income distribution. 15 He views the controversy over the “appropriate”
antitrust welfare standard as an example of this conflict. In Baker’s view, the loosening of antitrust
rules since Sylvania represents an attempt to allow greater creation of efficiencies, but the newer rules
also reduce the rate of false convictions and lead to a greater incidence of false acquittals that allow
firms to exercise market power. 16 Therefore, Baker argues, antitrust rules reflecting political bargaining
should adopt a qualified consumer welfare standard. 17
Of course, Priest’s article also raises an important issue of causation that makes the analysis
more complex. Baker suggests that conservatives worry more about efficiency and liberals worry more
about income distribution, and this divergence drives the differences in their preferred welfare
standards. But, Priest’s reasoning suggests that the causation might flow in the opposite direction.
Conservatives may favor the total welfare standard because it implies reduced government regulation,
not vice versa.
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This discussion has become confused by the fact that Robert Bork used the term consumer welfare to describe
total welfare. Robert H. Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-4 (1978). For one of many discussions of the
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True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loyola Consumer L.R. 336 (2010)
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The qualification is that firms should be permitted to capture large increases in producer surplus if the losses in
consumer surplus are small. Id. at 112. This corresponds to the Merger Guidelines approach to inextricably linked
efficiencies.
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Whichever the direction of the causation, these ideological differences can play themselves out,
even beginning from a common conceptual and factual starting point. For example, both Commissioner
Joshua Wright and I begin with the foundational role of decision theory in setting antitrust standards.
We also both favor the use of evidence. 18 But, we may differ with respect to how much evidence should
be required and which side should have the burden. Even putting aside any disagreements about the
antitrust goal and assuming that we both observe the same facts, we still may disagree about particular
cases where the effects are not certain. We may disagree about whether the conduct is presumptively
procompetitive or anticompetitive. Even if we agree on the direction of the presumption, we still may
disagree about the strength of the presumption. We also may disagree about the relative importance of
false positives and over-deterrence versus false negatives and under-deterrence, which will affect our
respective burdens of persuasion placed on the plaintiff versus defendant. We likely would agree about
what efficiencies should be deemed legitimate. But, we may disagree about the ability to achieve
legitimate efficiencies absent the restraint in question. These disagreements also may inadvertently
affect into our evaluation of the evidence itself. He might suggest that I am overly critical of the
benefits evidence while being overly accepting of the harm evidence, and I might suggest that he is
doing the opposite. For all these reasons, he might reject a liability finding in a particular case where I
might find liability.
Politics and ideology are fundamentally different. Politics is focused on obtaining votes, not
maintaining a philosophy. Ideological positions must be consistent. In contrast, political positions sway
with the wind. Indeed, political behavior is clearest when an individual makes a decision or takes a
position that is inconsistent with his ideology. However, because politicians often do have underlying
18

Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78
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Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J 209 (1986).
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philosophies, politics and ideology interact. In this regard, Republicans tend to be more conservative
and Democrats more liberal with respect to antitrust and other forms of market regulation.
This focus on ideological differences is not intended to claim that partisan or constituent politics
never matters, or that political pressure is never exerted. Both have been important determinants of
outcomes, as discussed below. As noted earlier, one way to identify the role of politics is when a
politician takes a position that appears inconsistent with his ideology. For example, President Reagan
took a conservative approach to antitrust, appointing William Baxter as AAG and generally supported
the DOJ’s controversial efforts to loosen vertical restraints law. However, he did not veto the bill that
prohibited the DOJ from participating in the oral argument in Monsanto. He also famously deviated
from his ideology with respect to the FCC’s Financial Interest and Syndication Rules. These rules
prevented the TV networks from gaining more control over syndicated programming by banning certain
vertical restraints in the contracts. Both the FCC and the DOJ in the early 1980s supported termination
of these rules. In this fight between the New York TV networks and the Hollywood studios, President
Reagan sided with Hollywood. He intervened and announced a 2-year moratorium on rule changes on
any changes to the rules, despite opposition from the DOJ and the FCC. 19
Just as ideology can be trumped by the Presidential or Congressional politics, ideology also can
be trumped by the needs of a lawyer’s constituents. This is change driven by economic self-interest
instead of votes or compaign contributions. The controversy over Section 2 provides a good example.
Former Reagan AAG Charles (“Rick”) Rule has been an important conservative ideological opponent of
Section 2, as well as outside counsel for Microsoft. In his testimony submitted to the Antitrust
Modernization Commission in 2005, for example, he opined that consumer welfare would be increased
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For one review, see Christopher J. Pepe, The Rise and Fall of the FCC’s Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, 1
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 67, n. 46 (1994), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol1/iss1/5/?utm_source=digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu%2Fmsl
j%2Fvol1%2Fiss1%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.
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if Section 2 were repealed or at least greatly restricted. 20 But, five years after his AMC testimony, Rule’s
continued representation of Microsoft led him to change his public position in a dramatic way. In a 2010
Wall Street Journal Op Ed piece ironically entitled “Trust Us Isn’t An Answer,” he opined that “the last 10
years have shown that reasonable antitrust rules can be applied to prevent exclusionary conduct by
dominant tech firms without destroying market forces.” 21 In contrast to his previous recommendations
to the AMC in 2005 that Section 2 be repealed or significantly restricted, Rule now recommended that
an antitrust case should be brought against Google. 22 This U-Turn would seem more to reflect the
interests of himself and his client, Microsoft, not a change in his underlying antirust philosophy. Of
course, this example also speaks to the role of lawyers versus expert economists. If an expert witness
changed his views in this way, a detailed explanation would be required to reconcile the apparently
divergent views. 23 If he did not, he would lose his credibility and his views would no longer be taken
seriously. 24
20

Charles F. (Rick) Rule, The Section 2 “Mess”: Do We Really Need It or Can We at Least Make It Better?, Written
Submission to the Antitrust Modernization Commission 12 (Sept. 29, 2005) at 12. I noted at the time that he
wanted to “fix” Section 2 in the same way that one “fixes” a cat.
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Charles F. (Rick) Rule, ‘Trust Us’ Isn’t an Answer, Wall Street Journal (September 17, 2010), available at
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1508823.
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Rick Rule, Former Head of DOJ Antitrust Division: Google’s Conduct Threatens the Free Market, available at
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consulted with Google in the Google/Motorola merger and with Yahoo in the proposed Google/Yahoo venture. I
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transaction.)
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Thomas Barnett, the AAG that issued the DOJ’s Section 2 report, may provide something closer to the expert
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basis of his antitrust experience that the FTC or DOJ should bring a monopolization complaint against Google for its
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. Statement of Thomas O. Barnett, Hearing on Competition in Online
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III.

Do Elections Matter?
The discussion above explains how difference in ideologies can affect attitudes towards antitrust

enforcement. Therefore, it would be no surprise if elections had significant effects on agency
enforcement. Voorhees suggests that the influence of elections on agency enforcement has declined. If
a basic consensus in antitrust has emerged and the state of the law were stable, then the influence of
elections would be waning. For example, while DOJ voting rights changes enforcement might vary
significantly across administrations, its enforcement of federal kidnapping laws does not. However, if
ideology remained important, then there might be large differences, particularly regarding
monopolization and exclusionary conduct.
Voorhees’ hypothesis that elections no longer matter is not consistent with my review of the
evidence. While there is a broad antitrust mainstream, there have been significant differences in the
enforcement records of the two political parties in recent years that likely have been driven by different
antitrust ideologies. Analysis of the number, type and other characteristics of DOJ civil non-merger
complaints, both over time and in comparison to the FTC, indicate that there have been significant
differences in the DOJ enforcement records across the three administrations,. These results indicate
that elections do matter. Of course, commentators may disagree about whether these differences
amount to better or worse antitrust enforcement.
At the same time, I also do not find this effect of elections at all disturbing. Antitrust has an
important role in the regulation of our economic system. It can affect the vitality of the competitive

available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57539837-38/what-an-anti-google-antitrust-case-by-the-ftcmay-look-like/. Barnett did not cite to the (then withdrawn) DOJ’s Section 2 report in this Senate testimony, only
the AMC report. I expect that he believes is that there are no inconsistencies between his testimony and the
Section 2 report, though he has not responded explicitly to criticisms that have been made. For example, Joshua
Wright, then a Google consultant, has suggested a number of conflicts that would need to be explained. See
Barnett v. Barnett on Antitrust Truth on the Market (May 11, 2011), available at
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/05/10/barnett-v-barnett-on-antitrust/.
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process, the speed of innovation, the distribution of income, and the efficiency of the market. 25 No one
would say that tax policy or climate change policy should be unaffected by elections, and antitrust policy
is no different.
This argument that antitrust is “just” law enforcement (or just economics) and, therefore,
should not vary by administration applies in a limited way. Criminal cartel enforcement only varies
across administrations according to the number of crimes that are detected, in much the same way that
bank robbery enforcement policy is not ideological. 26 But, as discussed above, much of civil antitrust is
not just “calling balls and strikes.” The size of the strike zone is a policy decision for both enforcers and
courts in the common law system that governs antitrust.
The next question is whether and how much elections matter for antitrust enforcement. I
analyze this issue with respect to the number, type and other characteristics of DOJ civil non-merger
actions. I compare the DOJ enforcement record over time. I also use the FTC record as a point of
comparison to the DOJ. I also discuss other areas of enforcement and policy.
My study used DOJ press releases to identify complaints. 27 I then examined the complaints to
determine the nature of the allegations (whether collusive, exclusionary, or both) and whether the
complaint alleged a violation of section 1, section 2 or both. 28 I include only matters in which there
25

Antitrust also reflects and defines norms of “proper” business conduct, though the declaration of such values is
no longer considered a primary purpose of antitrust rules.
26

I have not studied criminal enforcement for this article, but am only reporting the general view.
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Some previous studies have counted complaints by using the DOJ workload statistics.See Antitrust Division
Workload Statistics 2002-2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.html. For
example, Daniel Crane used the workload statistics to compare the G.W. Bush and Obama administrations. In the
last two years of the G.W. Bush administration (2007-2008), the DOJ filed 3 non-merger civil complaints. During its
2009 ramp up year, the Obama administration brought no cases. But, in the first two full years of 2010-2011, the
Obama DOJ brought 7 cases. Daniel A. Crane, Has The Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust
Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 July 18, 2012, available at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/65_Stan._L._Rev._Online_13.
28

It is interesting to note that none of the 3 administrations brought any complaints during their transition years.
There were no complaints counted in Calendar 1993, 2001 or 2009. This may reflect the previous administration
clearing out its inventory of viable investigations before it leaves. Or, it may take a new administration a period of
time to set its priorities and carry out its own investigations.
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were complaints and do not include Business Review Letters or matters that were resolved without a
complaint. 29 The number and characteristics of the DOJ complaints are summarized in Table 1. The DOJ
complaints are listed in Table 4 in the Appendix. 30

Clinton

G.W. Bush

G.W. Bush

G.W. Bush

Obama

(1993-2000)

(2001-2008)

(2005-2008)

(2001-2004)

(2009-2012)

Collusive

20

13

7

6

8

Exclusionary

21

3

3

0

2

Both

7

0

0

0

1

48

16

10

6

11

Total

Table 1
DOJ Civil Non-Merger Complaints: Summary Counts
29

This raises the issue of the proper division between business review letters and informal advice versus law
enforcement. I have taken a bright line approach. I do not count Visa’s voluntary and non-binding decision to
rescind its debit card rule in 2008. I also do not count the voluntary abandonment of the Google/Yahoo
advertising agreement in 2008. (This latter agreement arguably also would have fit more closely into the merger
category because it was a joint venture to partially combine.) See DOJ Press Release, Visa Inc. Rescinds Debit Card
Rule As A Result Of Department Of Justice Antitrust Investigation, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/234577.htm; DOJ Press Release, Yahoo! Inc. and Google
Inc. Abandon Their Advertising Agreement, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/239167.htm. (I consulted for Yahoo in the Google/Yahoo
matter.) I discuss these voluntary settlements in more detail below.
30

These complaint lists were developed by reviewing the DOJ website for press releases and other sources. This
data is organized by Calendar Years, not Fiscal Years. (However, because there were no complaints counted in
Calendar 1993, 2001 or 2009, this convention does not change the totals for each administration. (In this regard,
the Clinton DOJ total does not include the 1993 Canstar Sports USA consent decree. The Consent Decree is dated
March 17, 1993 and AAG Ann Bingaman was not officially nominated until April 29, 1993). The list reflects my
judgment calls regarding whether groups of complaints should be treated as separate complaints. I generally
collect complaints despite there being multiple defendants or settlements of the same matter that take place over
time. For example, the Obama DOJ complaints against Visa, MasterCard and American Express are treated as a
single case, as are both the earlier litigation against Visa and MasterCard during the Clinton administration and the
recent eBooks litigation. The Obama DOJ complaint against eBay in 2012 originated in the 2010 employee
poaching complaints that involved Lucasfilm and other companies, but it is treated as separate, based on my
understanding from a DOJ official that the eBay matter involved a separate investigation. The G.W. Bush MLS
complaints similarly are treated as separate matters, based on my understanding from a DOJ official that they
were treated as independent of one another. I treated the separate KeySpan and Morgan Stanley complaints as a
single case. It was suggested to me by a DOJ official that there were separate issues involved in the disgorgement
remedy for Morgan Staley, so my decision arguably undercounts the Obama complaints by 1.
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A. Total Number of DOJ Complaints
I focus first on the total number of complaints brought by each administration. In carrying out
this analysis, I basically concur with William Kovacic that counting complaints alone is not sufficient to
evaluate the beneficial productivity of the enforcement agency. 31 However, the use of complaint counts
here is intended to indicate the differences in agency behavior over time. Complaint counts seem like a
useful measure for this purpose, subject to the issues discussed below. In addition, I go beyond the
numbers and discuss the characteristics of the complaints as well.
One issue is that the supply of potentially problematical conduct is not exogenous. It depends
on the state of the law and law enforcement. For example, as discussed below, the first term Obama
DOJ brought more complaints than did the first term G.W.Bush DOJ, but many fewer complaints than
did the Clinton DOJ during its first term. This raises the question of why the number of complaints in
Obama’s DOJ’s first term have not returned nearly to the Clinton level, particularly in light of the
rhetoric of AAG Varney when she took office.
One possible answer is that mainstream antitrust ideology has moved significantly in a
conservative direction, so that even a Democratic administration would find it appropriate to bring
fewer complaints. Another possible answer is that antitrust law itself has changed dramatically, so that
there are fewer antitrust violations to attack. Of course, this latter answer does not mean that
ideology is irrelevant. To the contrary, the changes in antitrust law may be driven by the ideology of the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court. And, those changes may have driven or supported by DOJ
Amicus briefs.

31

William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON
L.R. 903 (2009).
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Moreover, as discussed below, the possible answer that it is solely changes in the law that has
led to fewer antitrust violations is problematical. Suppose that the loosening of merger enforcement
over the years has led to more mergers being attempted than previously, transactions that would have
been deterred by fear of enforcement. Nonetheless, if merger enforcement were perfectly predictable,
there would be no challenges, regardless of the DOJ’s enforcement standard. Firms would propose
deals right up to the current line and no further.32 This analysis suggests that there are only violations
when the law or law enforcement is uncertain, or when there are errors. Economists refer to this
analysis as a selection effect. 33
According to this reasoning, enforcement rates would fall when firms and their counselors are
surprised by the unexpected leniency of the administration relative to the law, and vice versa. 34 This
selection effect is weakened, of course. if the complaints involve conduct that was initiated during the
previous administration. But, if a significant selection effect remains, then the interpretation of the
counts would change. A low rate of complaints would mean that potential defendants were pleasantly
surprised by the permissiveness of the administration, relative to their expectations. A high rate of
complaints would mean that the potential defendants were unpleasantly surprised by the hostility of
the administration.
Looking backwards over time at the total number of complaints, the Clinton DOJ over its two
terms brought many more such complaints than did the G.W. Bush administration over its two terms.
32

If Jaywalking were per se illegal and subject to a mandatory death penalty, there would be few if any jaywalking
complaints.
33

There is an extensive literature on this point. For two important articles, see George Priest and Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and
the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 229 (1995). The selection effect also suggests
that a high loss rate by the agencies does not imply agency over-reaching of the law but rather flows from
asymmetric stakes. For example, see Steven C. Salop & Lawrence White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1031 (1986).
34

For a similar analysis, see Jonathan Baker and Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in
Robert Pitofsky (ed.), WHERE THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235, 245-247 (2008).
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According to my count, the Clinton DOJ brought 48 complaints. In contrast, the G.W. Bush DOJ brought
only 16 complaints.35 So, either the Bush administration was more lenient than the Clinton
administration, or more lenient than potential defendants expected, or both. Since the business
community and outside counsel probably did expect more lenient antitrust enforcement under G.W.
Bush, then the selection effect would imply a double-whammy, that is, the Bush DOJ must have been
even more lenient than the greater leniency expected to occur.
Returning to the counts, I also compared the first term Obama DOJ to the first term G.W. Bush
DOJ. I compared the first terms for each because it always takes a while for each administration to get
up to speed and none of the AAGs brought any complaints during the first year of a new administration.
So, comparing G.W. Bush’s second term to Obama’s first term does not seem like an apples-to-apples
comparison.
The Obama DOJ brought 11 complaints during their first term. This compares to 6 complaints
during the first 4 years of the G.W. Bush administration. 36 Thus, the Obama DOJ so far is running at a
higher rate than the DOJ during the first term of G.W. Bush. But, the Obama DOJ is certainly far below
the number of complaints brought during the first term of the Clinton administration. In addition, the
G.W. Bush DOJ brought 10 complaints during its second term versus only 6 complaints in its first term.
This data also raises the question of how the selection effect would affect the interpretation of
the results. The increase in Obama complaints over G.W. Bush complaints could be said to indicate that
potential defendants were a bit surprised by the possibly tougher stance of the new administration.
35

According to the DOJ Workload Statistics, the Clinton DOJ filed 50 Section 1 complaints and 8 Section 2
complaints. The difference may involve some double counting of complaints with multiple allegations in the
workload statistics. In contrast, it reports that the G.W. Bush DOJ bought 16 Section 1 complaints and zero Section
2 complaints. One other possible reason for the differences is that I use Calendar Years instead of Fiscal Years.
Because there were no complaints that I counted in Calendar 1993, 2001 or 2009, this will not change the totals
for each administration, only for each year. Differences also may be caused by variations in the way of counting
complaints with multiple defendants.
36

I compare the first term of each because the first year of the first term has been ramp up year for each of these
administrations. There were no complaints brought by the new administration either in 1993, 2001, or 2009.
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But, the selection effect is unlikely to explain the huge difference between the Clinton and Obama case
loads. There was some rhetoric by the Obama team that the DOJ would be getting tougher than
previously. But, with its complaints against NASDAQ, GE, Microsoft, Visa and MasterCard, American
Airlines and Dentsply, the Clinton DOJ built a credible reputation for litigation that would be unlikely to
leapfrog with just rhetoric. And the Obama DOJ has not yet established that reputation in its first term.
Finally, one issue raised by this review of the respective enforcement records is whether the
differences are the serendipitous result of complaints that came through the door or whether they
reflect decisions based on divergent ideologies. Ideology seems like a major factor. Looking at the
Clinton DOJ complaints, it seems unlikely to me that the G.W. Bush DOJ would have brought the
Microsoft case, and certainly would not have proposed a structural remedy if it did. It similarly seems
unlikely that it would have brought the American Airlines predatory pricing/capacity expansion case.
Visa would be a closer call because it involved concerted action. The Bush DOJ pursued the appeal in
Dentsply, but whether it would have filed the complaint t originally is a separate question.
Looking at the Obama DOJ complaints, my expectation is that the employment poaching
complaints probably would have been pursued by the Bush DOJ. The investigation of the
Keyspan/Morgan Stanley agreement was initiated during the Bush administration. No complaint was
filed, but Deborah Garza, who was Acting AAG at the end of the G.W. Bush administration, has said that
she supported this complaint – and the aggressive disgorgement remedy. I expect that the eBooks
litigation would be a closer call if the horizontal agreement were not a certainty. Or to state it more
precisely, now that the publishers have settled, and if DOJ were to accept Apple’s argument that Apple
was not privy to the discussions among the book publishers, would the matter have been litigated by
the Bush DOJ. I am asking this question because that case would amount to an attack on the
combination of RPM and MFNs adopted through parallel vertical agreements. In addition, the Bush DOJ
seemed adverse to litigation.
17

However, I do want to emphasize that these are just my predictions. It would be very
interesting to have the former AAGs themselves explain what led to their case selection criteria and why
they brought certain complaints and did not bring others. They also could opine about the complaints
of other AAGs that they would or would not have brought and why. That process could give a much
deeper understanding of any deological differences.
B. Exclusionary Conduct Complaints
Ideological differences are greatest with respect to monopolization and other exclusionary
conduct, so I also analyzed the allegations of the complaints. Voorhees suggests that Section 2
enforcement policy may not have changed significantly at the DOJ as a result of change in
administration. He specifically makes the point that the Obama administration has brought only one
Section 2 complaint and it did not involve a prominent defendant, despite AAG Varney’s rhetoric in
withdrawing the Bush administration’s Section 2 report in 2009. 37
To test this hypothesis, I classified the complaints according to whether they alleged a violation
of section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act, or both sections. I also classified the complaints according
to the whether the complaints alleged on collusive conduct (i.e., elimination of competition among the
defendants) or exclusionary conduct (i.e., conduct intended to exclude competition by non-parties), or
both. 38 There are large differences in the number of exclusionary conduct complaints and the
breakdown between collusive and exclusionary conduct complaints.

37

The one monopolization case involved United Regional Health Care System of Wichita Falls, Texas. For the
press release, see http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-at-249.html
38

I also identified whether the complaints focused on vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance). The RPM
case counts are not surprising. Even while vertical price restraints law was becoming more permissive, the Clinton
administration brought more such complaints, 8 for the Clinton DOJ versus none for the Reagan/Bush DOJ.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the Obama DOJ has not brought any standard RPM complaints under the Leegin rule of
reason standard. However, there is a caveat here. The Apple/eBook publishers case does involve resale price
maintenance. The difference from Leegin is, of course, that the adoption of the RPM allegedly involved a
horizontal conspiracy as well as vertical agreements. However, in the event that Apple is the only defendant left
standing, I expect that the purely vertical issues will take on a greater importance. See Kovacic, supra note 30 at
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I counted 9 complaints with Section 2 counts brought by the Clinton DOJ. 39 In contrast, Kovacic
and Muris each reported that the DOJ brought only 2 such complaints during the twelve years of the
Reagan/G.W.H Bush administrations. 40 There were no Section 2 complaints brought by the DOJ during
the G.W. Bush administration.
It is useful to widen the focus here beyond just Section 2 to exclusionary conduct allegations
brought under Section 1 as well as Section 2. The controversy among antitrust commentators – and the
ideology behind the DOJ’s Section 2 report – involves the concerns raised by exclusionary conduct
generally, not simply exclusionary conduct that might violate Section 2. Exclusionary conduct may be
carried out by the unilateral conduct of monopolists. But, exclusionary conduct also may occur in
vertical mergers or agreements that might be attacked under Section 1.
This broader focus affects the scorecard even more. Among the 48 Clinton complaints, 21
involved exclusionary conduct and 7 involved exclusionary as well as collusive conduct, for a total of 28
with exclusionary conduct allegations. This is significantly more than half of the Clinton complaints.
These complaints included the gamut of exclusionary conduct (e.g., predatory pricing, contractual and
physical tying, exclusive dealing, MFNs, exclusionary group boycotts, and so on). A number of these
complaints were criticized at the time as being novel or over-reaching.

460 (Table 5). My count had 3 RPM complaints by the Clinton DOJ, excluding the Canstar Sports matter. But there
are other types of vertical restraints besides RPM that I did not break out.
39

See Table 2 in the Appendix for a listing of the complaints. The Antitrust Division Workload statistics reports 8
complaints. According to the data collected by William Kovacic and Timothy Muris, the Clinton DOJ brought 7
monopolization and attempted monopolization complaints. Kovacic, supra note. 30 at 449 (Table 4) (2003);
Timothy J. Muris, How History Informs Practice – Understanding the Developments of Modern U.S. Competition
Policy (November 19, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisfallaba.pdf. However,
commentators may differ on the exact counts because some complaints allege violations of Section 1 as well as
Section 2 or because they involve separate complaints against multiple defendants. The Muris data also is
reported on an annual basis with only a single decimal point, so the Clinton result of 0.9 could indicate 7 or 8
complaints. These caveats suggest that small differences are not surprising. Nor do they change the basic
conclusion.
40

Id. The Data reported in a speech by Chairman Muris indicates that the Reagan DOJ brought 2 Section 2
complaints while the G.W.H Bush administration brought none. Muris’ results from the FTC also showed the same
contrast: 2 during Reagan; zero during G.W.H. Bush; 4 during Clinton.
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In contrast, the G.W. Bush administration brought only 3 exclusionary conduct complaints.
These complaints all involved multiple listing services. One targeted the National Association of Realtors
and the other two targeted local multiple listing services. These were all brought during the second
term.
The Obama DOJ administration has only one Section 2 complaint during its first term. However,
the Obama DOJ has brought several significant Section 1 complaints that allege exclusionary conduct.
There were 3 exclusionary conduct matters during the first term, 2 that were purely exclusionary and
one that was both collusive and exclusionary. In contrast, the G.W. Bush DOJ had none during the first
term.
The exclusionary conduct allegations in several of the Obama DOJ complaints have focused on
MFNs. The complaint against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan alleges that the dominant insurer
used most MFN provisions to exclude rivals in order to maintain its market power. 41 The DOJ also
brought Section 1 exclusionary conduct complaints against the credit card companies for agreements
involving MFNs. Visa and MasterCard settled, while the American Express case is still headed to trial.
The economics of the allegations in the eBooks complaint involves the combined use of MFNs and RPM
as exclusionary conduct to harm consumers by disadvantaging Amazon’s business strategy relative to
Apple. 42 The Wichita Falls Section 2 complaint concerns loyalty discounts.
C. Risk Aversion in Enforcement

41

The fact that these complaints were brought until Section 1 instead of Section 2 also raises another
confounding issue regarding the impact of politics and elections on antitrust enforcement. Over the past two
decades, with the aid of Amicus briefs from the agencies during Republican administrations, the Supreme Court
has made it significantly more difficult for the agencies to win monopolization complaints. Brooke Group, Trinko,
linkLine and Weyerhaeuser have tightened the standards for predatory pricing, refusals to deal, price squeezes and
predatory overbuying. Therefore, the agencies understandably may have been reluctant to bring Section 2
complaints where Section 1 would suffice.
42

This analysis can be placed in the exclusionary conduct framework set out in Leegin. Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,894 (2007)(use of RPM to forestall innovation or exclude smaller rivals or
new entrants).
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There also are apparent differences in the riskiness of the complaints among the
administrations. More of the Clinton DOJ complaints involved complaints with seemingly more risky
theories and brought against better financed national entities. For example, the Clinton DOJ brought
complaints against Microsoft, Visa, 43 GE, American Airlines, and NASDAQ. A number of these were high
profile, complex complaints. In comparison, the G.W. Bush DOJ was more conservative. It generally
brought less risky complaints. It also failed to litigate any complaints after its loss in the
Oracle/PeopleSoft merger, a fact which also is consistent with greater risk aversion. 44
The size of the defendants is relevant for two main reasons. First, litigation against larger
companies is more visible and so has greater deterrence effects. Such cases also often generate more
consumer benefits because more people and more revenue is affected. So, size is a relevant measure of
enforcement intensity. Second, larger national firms generally have deeper pockets, which creates a
greater threat of litigating and litigating more intensely than are the smaller ones. These firms also are
more likely to be repeat players in the litigation threat game, which also gives them an incentive to play
hard ball. So, the size difference among the defendants also may indicate a certain greater risk aversion
by the Bush DOJ.
This issue of possible risk aversion also might usefully be applied to the two 2008 matters (the
Visa rule and the Google/Yahoo advertising agreement) that the DOJ resolved informally without a
complaint (and that I did not include in my counts). While the DOJ may have threatened litigation,
taking this voluntary settlement would have significantly reduced the DOJ’s risk of having to go to trial.
A complaint and consent decree in the Visa matter likely would have alleged that Visa had market
power, that the proposed rule was a violation of Section 1 and that Visa was not simply a single entity
imposing a vertical restraint. Having these allegations in a complaint may have materially weakened
43

United States v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 811 (2004)

44

For example, see James A. Keyte, United States v. H&R Block: The DOJ Invokes Brown Shoe to Shed the Oracle
Albatross, 26 ANTITRUST 32 (2012)
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Visa’s position in the class action litigation and other matters. Thus, it would have been less likely to
settle and more likely to take the case to trial. Similarly, in Google/Yahoo, a complaint and consent
decree likely would have required a search market to be defined and high market shares to be
calculated. Again, the parties likely would have been more reluctant to settle, which then would have
forced the DOJ into risky litigation or be forced to cave. The informal agreements were a way for DOJ to
eliminate these litigation risks.
However, such non-binding informal agreements constitute less effective law enforcement and
provide less deterrence. While such informal actions do terminate the immediate conduct, they also
carry less weight because they cannot be used by the agencies or third parties in future proceedings.
They also reduce deterrence because they prevent the parties from proposing anticompetitive activities
at no risk. This conclusion does not seem controversial. Indeed, if informal settlements were
considered equally effective, then it raises the question about why agencies should ever issue
complaints and require consent decrees for matters that could be resolved informally by such
gentlemen’s agreements.
The Obama FTC recently accepted a similar non-binding voluntary commitment from Google
that raises these same issues. 45 Commissioner Rosch condemned this remedial approach as ineffective
law enforcement. 46 He also pointed out that it was criticized by the ABA Committee on the FTC back in
1969.47 Voluntary commitments are accepted by the European Commission under Article 9 of
Regulation 1/2003. While they also avoid a formal complaint, they are legally binding.

45

The FTC Press Release is available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm. The Google commitment
letter is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf.
46

Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding Google’s Search Practices
(January 3, 2013) at 6-8, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchroschstmt.pdf.
Commissioner Rosch also did not believe that Google violated the law.
47

Id. at n.16.
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The Obama DOJ has been in-between with respect to risk-taking and cutting-edge theories.
Some of its complaints raised more novel issues. Several involved MFNs. The complaint against Apple
and the top book publishers involved collective action to adopt RPM and MFNs, a complaint that is could
be very controversial, absent a horizontal agreement. The complaints against Keyspan and Morgan
Stanley were the first use of a disgorgement remedy by the DOJ. A number of the Obama complaints
have involved deep-pocket national competitors that might be expected to litigate, including Apple,
American Express, Visa and MasterCard, and the high tech Silicon Valley firms accused of employee
market division. However, it has not achieved a level of enforcement nearly approaching the Clinton
DOJ.
D. Comparison to FTC Enforcement
One of the other questions raised in the Voorhees article is whether the FTC and DOJ differed
with respect to exclusionary conduct. I have analyzed the FTC’s non-merger complaints for the three
administrations. In addition to showing how FTC enforcement has changed, the FTC data also is useful
for comparison to the DOJ. Bringing the FTC record into the mix permits some control for changes in the
legal and economic climate over time. The preliminary results are listed below in Table 2. 48 The FTC
complaints are listed in the Appendix at Table 5. 49

48

These results are preliminary because some further refinement is needed, particularly on the pre-1996
complaints. Republican Tim Muris became Chair in June 2001. Schering Plough was brought under Robert
Pitofsky’s Chairmanship in April 2001, and was counted as part of the Pitofsky Chairmanship, despite it being
brought in Calendar 2001. During the Clinton administration, Republican Janet Steiger remained Chair until April
1995 when she was replaced by Democrat Robert Pitofsky. I have not yet adjusted the counts to reflect this.
(There were 21 complaints in 1993-94 and 13 complaints in 1995. Of those 13, 4 were issued before Pitosfky took
over. So, the total for Chairwoman Steiger is 25 and the total for Pitofsky is 46.) This reduces the Pitofsky
complaints per year (because there were relatively more complaints brought in 1993 and 1994). But the basic
conclusions would change because the most significant complaints were brought subsequently, including Dell,
Intel, Mylan, Toys-R-Us and the pharma complaints. (In addition, I am mainly using the FTC data to compare the
FTC and DOJ during the three administrations.)
49

For this study, I began with a list of FTC complaints since 1996 posted by the Commission. See
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist/alphabetical/expanded/alphabetical.pdf. The complaints decided before 1996 are
available at http://ftc.gov/os/decisions/index.shtm, but the list gives the decisions, not the dates of the
complaints. This leaves a potential gap for pre-1996 matters that required further digging and the potential for
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Clinton

G.W. Bush

G.W. Bush

G.W. Bush

Obama

(1993-2000)

(2001-2008)

(2005-2008)

(2001-2004)

(2009-2012)

Collusive

48

47

13

34

9

Exclusionary

21

20

15

5

7

Both

6

0

0

0

0

75

67

28

39

16

Total

Table 2
FTC Non-Merger Complaints: Summary Counts
The FTC is an independent, bipartisan agency with members whose terms overlap
administrations. As Tim Muris has emphasized, the Chairman of the FTC has the power to set the
agenda for non-merger investigations and complaints. 50 But, as a bi-partisan, multi-member
commission, there also are opportunities for logrolling. For both reasons, one would expect the FTC to
be more tethered to the middle and subject to dampened swings, relative to the DOJ.
I begin by examining the FTC complaints over time. Comparing the FTC complaints under the
Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations, there are significant similarities. First, the G.W. Bush FTC did not
bring very significantly fewer complaints than the Clinton FTC. 51 Second, the G.W. Bush FTC did not
stop bringing exclusionary conduct complaints, though they did bring somewhat fewer than the Clinton
FTC (i.e., 20 vs 27). The Bush administration FTC continued the Clinton’s administration’s program of
cutting-edge exclusion complaints involving the pharmaceutical complaints that excluded generic
error. One judgment call involves whether to aggregate similar complaints brought on the same day but that are
not part of the same complaint. I have preliminarily chosen to aggregate these, but will engage in further
analysis, particularly on the pre-1996 complaints.
50

Panel Discussion: Politics & Policy in 1981, James Cooper (ed.), THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A
THIRTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (2013)(forthcoming) at __
51

During the period of Steiger and Pitofsky leadership, the FTC brought 75 complaints, versus 67 under the G.W.
Bush administration. (Note that the FTC was led by Republican Chair, Janet Steiger, until May 1995 and a
significant number of the Clinton administration complaints were brought under her leadership.)
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pharmaceuticals. 52 The Bush administration FTC also brought exclusion actions against Rambus, Unocal
and N-Data for Kodak-like opportunistic behavior involving standard setting, complaints that followed
the Dell complaint brought under FTC Chairman Pitofsky. Third, complaints against healthcare providers
for collusive price setting were a high priority in both decades. Fourth, it appears that FTC Chairs,
Deborah Majoras and William Kovacic, followed roughly the same agenda as Chairman Muris though
with significantly fewer complaints. In 2001-2004, the FTC brought 39 complaints, versus 28 in the
2005-2008 period. 53
There also were some differences that show the power of the Chair to set the agenda. First, the
Pitofsky (and Steiger) FTC brought a number of RPM complaints, whereas the Bush administration
brought none. Second, the Muris FTC brought a significant number of state action complaints, which
were not a priority for Pitofsky.
Comparing the other high visibility FTC complaints, I expect that Pitofsky would have supported
the Polygram complaint brought by Chairman Muris. Chairman Muris suggested that he likely would
not have brought the single firm exclusionary conduct complaint against Intel. 54 He also likely would
have supported the Toys-R-Us complaint in light of the evidence of horizontal communication among

52

These included the complaints against Biovail, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/biovailcomplaint.htm; three related complaints against Bristol Myers Squibb,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf; Cephelon, available at
http://www2.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610182/080213complaint.pdf; Warner Chillicott, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410034/051107comp0410034%20.pdf .

53

It is noteworthy that the N-Data complaint was issued over the dissent of Chairwoman Majoras and future
Chairman Kovacic. For the majority statement, see Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: In the Matter of
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 0510094, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf. For Chairwomen Majoras’ dissent, see Dissenting
Statement of Chairman Majoras: In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No.
0510094http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122majoras.pdf. For Commissioner Kovacic’s dissent, see
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner William E. Kovacic: In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No.
0510094, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122kovacic.pdf
54

Personal communication. He lacked sufficient information from the Press Release to make a call about Mylan.
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the manufacturers. However, in the absence of this evidence, he was unlikely to have supported the
case, whereas I expect that that Chairman Pitofsky would have.
Comparing the Bush and Obama FTC, the Obama FTC has brought fewer complaints – 16 in the
first term versus 40 during the first term of G.W. Bush. The Obama FTC has brought 7 exclusionary
conduct complaints during the first term versus 5 during the first Bush term. This small number of
Obama FTC complaints raises the big question about why the caseload has declined. Comparing the
types of complaints, the Obama administration has continued the program of bringing pharma exclusion
complaints, despite a number of losses. Outside of pharma, the Obama administration brought high
visibility exclusionary conduct complaints against Intel and Transitions that the Republicans would have
been less likely to bring. 55
I also compared the enforcement records of the FTC and the DOJ. Voorhees asks whether the
FTC and DOJ differed from one another during the Bush administration. The Bush FTC brought many
more complaints than did the Bush DOJ. A more refined analysis compares the change in the number of
DOJ complaints to the change in the number of FTC complaints. The results of comparing Tables 1 and
2 in this way are summarized in Table 3, which reports the number of DOJ complaints of a particular
type as a fraction of the number of FTC complaints in the same administration period.
Clinton

G.W. Bush

G.W. Bush

G.W. Bush

Obama

(1993-2000)

(2001-2008)

(2005-2008)

(2001-2004)

(2009-2012)

Collusive

43%

28%

54%

18%

89%

Exclusionary
(Or Both)

108%

15%

20%

0%

43%

66%

24%

36%

15%

69%

Total

Table 3
55

The FTC’s Google patent settlement in 2013 is not included in the sample.
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DOJ Civil Non-Merger Complaints as a Percentage of FTC Complaints
This comparison of differences in the ratios yields a number of interesting results about the
lower enforcement levels at the Bush DOJ in comparison to the FTC, relative to the other
administrations. First, referring back to Tables 1 and 2 as well as Table 3, the Clinton era DOJ brought
about 64% of the number of complaints brought by the FTC (i.e., 48 vs 75), whereas the Bush era DOJ
brought only 24% as many complaints as the FTC (i.e., 16 vs 67). Second, the Clinton DOJ brought 104%
as many complaints that raised exclusion issues as did the FTC (i.e., 28 vs 27), whereas the Bush DOJ also
brought 15% as many exclusionary conduct complaints (i.e., 3 vs 20). Third, the first-term Obama DOJ
brought 69% as many complaints as did the FTC (i.e., 11 vs 16), whereas the first-term Bush DOJ brought
only 15% as many complaints as did the FTC (i.e., 6 vs 34). Fourth, with respect to exclusionary conduct
complaints, the first-term Obama DOJ brought 43% as many complaints that raised exclusion concerns
as did the FTC (i.e., 3 vs 7), whereas the first-term Bush DOJ brought no complaints while the FTC
brought 5. Fifth, the ratios for purely collusive conduct complaints are somewhat more similar between
Clinton and Bush. The Clinton DOJ brought 42% as many as the FTC (i.e., 20 vs 48), whereas the Bush
DOJ brought 28% as many collusive complaints as did the FTC (i.e., 13 vs 47). However, comparing the
first terms of Obama and Bush, the differences are much larger. The first-term Obama DOJ brought 89%
as many purely collusion complaints as the FTC (i.e., 8 vs 9), whereas the first-term Bush DOJ brought
only 18% as many (i.e., 6 vs 34).
Finally, another noteworthy difference between the Bush FTC and the Bush DOJ involves the
pharma exclusion complaints. The Bush administration DOJ did not join the FTC in its petition for
certiorari in Schering Plough. In contrast, the Obama DOJ recently has supported the FTC in seeking
certiorari in the Watson case. The Obama DOJ also filed an Amicus brief in support of reconsideration
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of the legality of pay-for-delay payments at the Second Circuit in the Cipro case. 56 In addition, the FTC
has shown aggressiveness by continuing to pursue this litigation agenda, despite several losses in court.
E. Vertical Merger Enforcement
Vertical mergers also raise exclusion concerns, so they are worth examining as well. There are
significant differences between the G.W. Bush DOJ and the Democratic administrations that preceded
and followed it. I have not done my own careful count but have relied on the work of others. Jeffrey
Church lists 10 DOJ vertical merger enforcement actions during the Clinton administration. 57 Church
and Jonathan Jacobson have identified 15 vertical merger enforcement matters by the FTC during the
Clinton administration. 58 In contrast, I have identified only one clearly vertical merger action by the
G.W. Bush DOJ, Northrop Grumman/TRW. 59 There also were two DOJ horizontal merger enforcement
actions that had vertical exclusion aspects, Masonite/Premdor 60 and Monsanto/Delta and Pine. 61 In my

56

For example, see Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation, In Re: Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (July 6, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.htm.
57

Jeffrey Church, Vertical Mergers, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1455 (ABA Section of Antitrust
Law 2008). The DOJ matters are: United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1999); United States v. USA
Waste Servs., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,171 (W.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. Allied Waste Indus., 1998-1 Trade
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1996); United States v. Sprint Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)¶ 71,300 (D.D.C. 1995); United States v. TeleCommc’ns, 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,496 (D.D.C. 1994); United States v. MCI Commc’ns, 1994-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 70,730 (D.D.C. 1994); United States v. AT&T Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158 (D.D.C. 1994); United States v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 98-CV-00731 (D.D.C. Mar. 23 1998) (verified complaint); United States v. MCI
Commc’ns, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,730 (D.D.C. 1994).
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U.S. v. Premdor, Inc., No. 1:01CV01696 (D.D.C. 2001). I consulted with the parties in this matter.
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view, both of these primarily concerned horizontal overlaps, though there were vertical issues as well. 62
I so far have identified only one vertical merger action by the FTC during the G.W. Bush administration,
Cytyc/Digene. 63
The Obama DOJ in the first term has brought enforcement actions involving exclusionary effects
from vertical mergers primarily in 4 matters, Comcast/NBCU, 64 Live Nation/Ticketmaster, Google/ITA, 65
and GrafTech/Seadrift Coke. 66 While Live Nation/Ticketmaster had important vertical aspects, the the
DOJ focused more on the horizontal issues. 67 These Obama vertical merger complaints also involved the
type of conduct remedies that often are criticized by conservative commentators. Thus, elections have
seemed to matter with respect to exclusion issues in vertical merger complaints too. 68
61

United States v. Monsanto Co. (May 31, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f223600/223677.htm. Monsanto’s previous attempt to acquire Delta and Pine was
abandoned in 1999 in the face of DOJ concerns. I consulted for an interested party in this matter.
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I have not yet done a careful count of Obama FTC vertical merger complaints. In 2010, there were vertical
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F. Amicus Briefs
Amicus briefs are another important way in which elections matter. Amicus briefs give an
administration an antitrust forum to influence the courts. The agencies write numerous Amicus briefs
each year, both to Circuit courts as well as the Supreme Court.
Leah Brannon and Douglas Ginsburg have reviewed the Amicus briefs of the Solicitor General (SG) to
the Supreme Court for the period through 2007. Their review indicates the influence of the SG on the
Court, in that the SG generally ends up on the winning side. 69 The G.W. Bush administration supported
defendants in almost every one of the large number of cases that came before the Court, including
Trinko, 70 Twombly, 71 linkLine, 72 Dagher, 73 Weyerhaeuser, 74 and Leegin. 75 In contrast, the Obama
administration supported the plaintiffs in American Needle, as well as the FTC’s Watson case. 76 Watson
is particularly significant in that the SG did not join the FTC in its petition in Schering Plough during the
G.W. Bush administration. 77
However, looking backwards in time, there is less difference. The Clinton administration
supported the defendant in both Discon and Khan, which (along with the FTC’s California Dental case)
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Weyerhaeuser Company v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, 549 U.S. 312 (2007). I consulted with
Weyerhaeuser on this matter.
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were the main antitrust cases during that 8 year period. During the G.H.W. Bush and Reagan
administrations, defendants were favored by the SG in the majority of the cases, but the SG notably
supported the plaintiffs in Allied Tube and Hydrolevel, as well as NCAA and Maricopa. The SG notably
did not take a position in Aspen Ski, Sharp or American Stores.
If there is a political effect operating here, the pure numbers conceivably might support a
hypothesis that the Court has been less likely to accept antitrust cases during recent Democratic
administrations. I have not studied this issue. But, if true, one possible explanation for this outcome
could be the behavior of the DOJ itself. The DOJ and SG during Republican administrations have
seemed aligned in their efforts to intervene in private cases where the plaintiffs prevailed below and
they saw opportunities to reverse and thereby restrict doctrine in certain areas. It would seem likely
that their briefs were influential in getting the Court to take those cases. In contrast, a Democratic DOJ
rationally might have been less enthusiastic about urging certiorari when the defendants had prevailed
below, out of fear that the relatively conservative Court would grant certiorari and make the law even
more permissive. Of course, it would take more work to evaluate this issue rigorously.
G. Agency Merger Guidelines
Guidelines also serve as a forum to influence the courts. The 1982 Merger Guidelines were
intended to loosen merger law as well as policy by giving more prominence to economics, and they
clearly succeeded in doing so. 78 The DOJ’s 1984 Vertical Restraints Guidelines also were intended to
reflect the conservative approach to vertical restraints and influence the courts to adopt a more
permissive stance. The DOJ’s Section 2 report had a similar goal, as discussed in more detail below.
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Two notable Circuit court opinions that cited the Merger Guidelines in finding against the government were
United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) and United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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The Obama administration issued new Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010. 79 These Guidelines
raise the HHI thresholds. But they otherwise indicates a somewhat more pro-enforcement tilt,
including a modernized critical loss methodology that leads to narrower markets, introduction of the
parallel accommodating coordinated conduct theory that does not require detailed evidence of rapid
detection and punishment, as well as greater suspicion of powerful buyers as a constraint on
coordination. The Guidelines also now incorporate concerns regarding partial ownership interests and
exclusionary effects. Some of these ideas were contained in the joint FTC/DOJ 2006 Merger
Commentary, but they are given greater visibility and greater emphasis in the Merger Guidelines. 80
The impact of ideology and politics can be illustrated by the treatment of unilateral effects in the
Merger Guidelines. The 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines focused on what we now call coordinated
effects concerns. For example, in his 1986 Hospital Corporation of America opinion, Judge Posner
stated that “[w]hen an economic approach is taken in a section 7 case, the ultimate question is whether
the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate collusion.” 81 Unilateral effects had no role, despite the
fact that there was a well-established economic analysis of non-collusive oligopoly conduct dating back
100 years – the famous Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. 82 The only mention of what we would now call
unilateral effects was in the so-called “leading firm proviso” that applied to firms with market shares in
excess of 35%. Product differentiation was viewed as a reason why coordination would be less likely to
succeed, but not why there would be greater concerns about unilateral effects.
79

Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (August 19, 2010),
(hereinafter, 2010 Merger Guidelines) available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html
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Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (March 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf. For a description
that stresses the continuity with the Commentary, see Carl Shapiro, Update from the Antitrust Division (November
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For a non-technical description, see William J. Kolasky, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead
Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11050.htm.
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The theory of unilateral effects from mergers first was included in the 1992 Merger Guidelines
adopted when James Rill was AAG. 83 It was given great emphasis by the economists involved in the
drafting. 84 However, there was an apparent concern that a full embrace of unilateral effects would lead
to a significant increase in merger enforcement. This is because significant unilateral effects concerns
can arise even if the combined market shares of the merging parties, and market concentration, are low.
Indeed, the analysis of unilateral effects does not even strictly require markets to be defined.
Apparently to avoid supporting over-enforcement, the 1992 Merger Guidelines added a sentence that
could be read to suggest that unilateral effects theories would only be pursued if the combined market
shares of the merging parties exceeded 35% and/or if the parties’ products were uniquely closest
substitutes, two caveats that do not follow directly from the economic analysis of unilateral effects.
The use of unilateral effects increased considerably during the Clinton administration. The use
of sophisticated empirical data in the Staples case led to greater visibility for unilateral effects analysis.
For example, Malcolm Coate and Shawn Ulrick report on a sample of 128 mergers evaluated by the FTC
over the 1996-2003 period for which detailed data was collected on mergers that had second
requests. 85 The agency analysis appeared to focus on unilateral effects in about 70% of these mergers.
In addition, unilateral effects theories were disproportionately likely to lead to enforcement actions.
About 77% of the enforcement actions involved unilateral effects. 86
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For one view of the history, see Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 31 (2003)

84

Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines,1991 BROOKINGS
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The change of administration in 2001 rekindled interest in coordinated effects theories at the
DOJ. 87 One reason for this was a concern about over-enforcement resulting from unilateral effects
theories. This is because harms from unilateral effects do not necessarily require high market shares, or
even market definition at all. 88
Unilateral effects concerns take on a very prominent role in the 2010 Guidelines, including the
more controversial, explicit use of upward pricing pressure indices. Over-enforcement concerns were
raised in the comments of the ABA Antitrust Section, particularly the impact of high margins on market
definition and unilateral effects analysis. 89
Another possibly significant change involves the hypothetical monopolist test methodology for
relevant product market definition for markets with differentiated products. The 2010 Merger
Guidelines use a newer critical loss methodology that incorporates into the analysis the information
about demand substitution revealed by the margin of a profit-maximizing firm. 90 This methodology
leads to systematically narrower markets. For example, the Guidelines provide an example of a market
satisfying the hypothetical monopolist test where two-thirds of the customers lost by a firm that raises
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For some contemporaneous commentary, see Charles A. James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects (Aug. 13,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm. See also William J. Kolasky,
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price substitute to firms outside the relevant market. 91 Of course, it remains to be seen the extent to
which this test will be used by the agencies and whether it will be accepted by the courts.
H. The 2001 Microsoft Settlement
The Voorhees article specifically asks about the Microsoft settlement and how it was affected by
the 2000 election. This is relevant to the discussion of exclusionary conduct because it is the most
important Section 2 complaint to be brought in a generation. In my view, the Microsoft case is a very
good example of how elections matter. 92
The case obviously was highly visible and politically sensitive from the very beginning. While still
a Presidential candidate, George W. Bush expressed great reservations about the Microsoft case and the
break-up remedy. Speaking at a campaign event in the state of Washington, 15 miles from Redmond, he
is quoted as saying that “he was ‘worried’ about the consequences ‘if this company were to be broken
apart, this engine of change, engine of growth . . . [B]ut we'll see what the courts say on the issue.’" 93
Several days later, Mr. Bush discussed the proposed breakup remedy in even clearer negative terms. A
Bloomberg report in USA Today entitled, “Bush Opposes Microsoft Breakup” states, "Asked before a
campaign event Friday on Long Island whether Redmond, Wash.-based Microsoft should be broken up,
Bush said, 'I'm against it. There has got to be a better remedy than to break up a successful company
that employs lots of people.'' 94
It is certainly reasonable to expect that this statement would have had salience for the DOJ
Transition team and the people he appointed to lead the Justice Department. In fact, two members of
the Transition team were Rick Rule and Charles James. As noted earlier, Rick Rule was one of
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Microsoft’s attorneys and Charles James was then appointed to be the Antitrust AAG in 2001.
Moreover, Rule was one of the lead negotiators for the Microsoft settlement and Charles James was the
AAG who agreed to the settlement.
The Voorhees article suggests that the weakness of the settlement was mainly the result of a
weak court of appeals decision. In my view, the decision was not weak at all. It affirmed the primary
Section 2 monopolization count and adopted a Section 1-style rule of reason balancing standard in the
process. 95 It did remand the tying count. The District rejected the Section 1 exclusive dealing count,
which was not appealed, the D.C. Circuit stated its disagreement with the standard used by the District
Court. The D.C. Circuit also affirmed the illegality of Microsoft’s exclusive dealing under Section 2. To
make a criminal law analogy, it is as if the defendant was found guilty of kidnapping murder, but the jury
hung on the assault count. The DC Circuit did express reservations about the break-up remedy, so it
certainly could be argued that a Democratic administration also might have abandoned that remedy.
But, even the conduct constraints placed on Microsoft’s behavior by the settlement were weak,
including provisions that said little more than Microsoft should not “unreasonably” exclude. The
settlement also did not prohibit the commingling browser and operating system code, despite the fact
that this conduct was explicitly held to be anticompetitive in the D.C. Circuit opinion. 96 At the time, I
characterized the settlement as “catch and release” antitrust enforcement. Microsoft still retains its
monopoly in desktop operating systems, though it has not been able to leverage this monopoly into
Internet search or mobile operating systems. 97
J.
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36

The Voorhees article also raises the issue of the DOJ’s Section 2 report issued in 2008 and its
subsequent withdrawal in 2009. I think this episode is consistent with the interaction of politics,
ideology and elections. The primary purpose of the Section 2 report did not seem to be a statement of
the DOJ’s enforcement intentions. 98 The report was issued two months before the 2008 election, seven
years into the Bush administration. It was already quite clear that the Division was unlikely to bring any
Section 2 complaints or many exclusionary conduct complaints under Section 1. Instead, the likely
audience of the report was the courts and its likely message was that the courts should take a very
permissive approach to exclusionary conduct.
Nor did the report provide a consensus view of Section 2 law. The FTC dissented from its
conclusions. The report also reached more conservative conclusions that did the Antitrust
Modernization Commission. Thus, AAG Varney’s withdrawal of the report in 2009 was no surprise. It
was an obvious tit-for-tat response to the issuance of the report and served as a clear signal to the
courts about the lack of consensus.
Withdrawing the report also was necessary if the administration were to have any interest in
litigating exclusionary conduct cases. Herbert Hovenkamp has stated this point very well.
As soon as President Obama was elected, withdrawal of the Section 2 Report
was virtually a foregone conclusion. The Report was extremely tolerant of single-firm
conduct, making it extraordinarily difficult to prove a violation in many areas,
particularly those involving pricing and refusals to deal. If President Obama’s
antitrust enforcers were to act consistently with his own campaign positions, they
very likely would have ended up litigating against their own Report. Bitter
experience with an earlier version of the Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines
demonstrated that business firms are entitled to rely on antitrust guidelines. As a
result, the Division could not state a position declaring one standard and later bring
an action seeking to establish a standard that is harsher on defendants. Thus, the
Obama Antitrust Division’s hand was forced: unless the Division withdrew the
Report, the Division would continue to be noosed in by it. 99
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Finally I think that there is also an ideological interpretation. The Section 2 report likely
represented a statement of AAG Barnett’s ideology regarding the proper enforcement of
Section 2. The withdrawal of the report by AAG Varney thus similarly was a statement that the
Obama DOJ did not share the antitrust ideology of the previous administration, even aside
from the other motives discussed above. 100
*

*

*

Based on all this evidence, it certain appears that elections and ideology have
mattered with respect to DOJ enforcement. But, the DOJ under G.W. Bush brought fewer civil
non-merger complaints, relative to the Clinton DOJ and the Obama DOJ during its firm term.
The G.W. Bush DOJ had less focus on exclusionary conduct enforcement, both with respect to
civil non-merger complaints and vertical merger cases. (I did not study horizontal mergers.)
Even aside from the numbers, its enforcement record showed a disinclination to take on large
national firms or go to court. The same conclusions follow from a comparison of the DOJ to
the FTC during the G.W. Bush administration. The DOJ brought relatively fewer cases, and
relatively fewer exclusionary conduct complaints, although the FTC also was not active in
vertical merger enforcement.
In the policy realm, the G.W. Bush also expressed its distaste for exclusionary conduct
enforcement with the Microsoft settlement in 2001 and Section 2 report in 2008 serving as
book ends to a period of minimal enforcement. At the Supreme Court, it sided regularly with
defendants’ attempt to limit class action litigation, particularly with respect to Section 2. It
also did not support the FTC in its pharma exclusionary conduct case.

100

In this interpretation, the FTC statement represented opposition to the ideology, not just the DOJ’s
enforcement plans. After all, as an independent agency that is given deference by the courts and with a different
statute, the FTC may well not share the DOJ’s enforcement agenda.
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The Obama DOJ has reversed direction. It withdrew the Section 2 report and has
issued more enforcement-oriented Merger Guidelines. It has taken aggressive action towards
MFNs and has been willing to take large cases to court, including mergers. At the same, it has
not so far generated the degree of change that some expected. Of course, a DOJ generally
blossoms in the second term of the administration. So, the Obama DOJ must still be treated as
a work in progress.
IV.

Political Pressure
Voorhees also raised the issue of political pressure on the agencies and the courts. It is clear that

politicians can have an effect on the courts and the agencies through the appointment process. But, this
does not mean that they often try to place pressure in specific matters and if they succeed when they
do. The successful application of such pressure does appear rare but it also is hard for outsiders to
detect. There are some clear examples of pressure being inflicted and affecting antitrust law and policy
in important ways.
A. Political Pressure on the Supreme Court: the Case of Vertical Price Agreements
It seems obvious that the political climate or partisan politics animates the Supreme Court. In
antitrust, one classic example is Appalachian Coals, which interrupted the clear trend of Section 1
doctrine. Perhaps the clearest and most important modern example of politics affecting antitrust
doctrine is Sylvania and its progeny.
Sylvania was decided in the context of longstanding political developments involving vertical
price restraints. The Sylvania opinion notes the fact that Congress had recently approved the per se rule
against vertical price fixing by repealing the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts. 101 But, the Monsanto
story is even more interesting. 102 The DOJ wrote an Amicus brief supporting reversal of Dr. Miles. In
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response, Congress passed a bill denying the DOJ funding to argue the case at the Supreme Court. AAG
Baxter noticeably attended the oral argument but did not argue. Andrew Gavil’s study of the Powell and
Marshall papers makes it clear that Justice Powell did not attempt to overrule Dr. Miles in Monsanto in
light of these apparent Congressional attitudes. 103 In his file memo, Justice Powell noted that Congress
had prohibited the Justice Department from participating in the Monsanto oral argument. This seems
like a clear example of political pressure having a potentially very significant on the Supreme Court.
But, perhaps the most interesting part of story is the way in which the Supreme Court dealt
with this pressure. Although it found for the plaintiff in Monsanto and did not reverse Dr. Miles, the
Court in its opinion tightened the legal standards governing the agreement requirement and thereby
restricted the scope of Dr. Miles’ per se rule. In both Monsanto and Sharp, the Court made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prove the existence of a vertical price fixing agreement to which the per se rule
would then be applied. In Monsanto, the Court held that it was insufficient for the plaintiff merely to
establish that termination of a dealer followed the complaints of a rival. In Sharp, the Court held that it
was necessary to show an agreement about a specific price, rather than just a price range. Moreover,
the Court was quite explicit that the goal of this doctrinal tactic was to restrict the continued impact of
Dr. Miles in order to protect the rule of reason standard set out in Sylvania.
Thus, the interesting question is thus how best to interpret this story of political pressure. One
interpretation is that the Supreme Court successfully resisted political pressure from Congress and
loosened the law of vertical price restraints. But, another interpretation is quite different. This
interpretation is that the Court evaded the political pressure only by manipulating and distorting the
antitrust doctrine of agreement. 104 They accounted for potential efficiencies from vertical price
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restraints by making it more difficult to prove a price agreement. But, this tactic significantly affected
the antitrust doctrine of the agreement requirement beyond RPM. The Court also made it harder to
prove horizontal price fixing agreements. This has had a significant impact on horizontal collusion cases,
such as the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Blomkest. 105 Since horizontal price fixing often is called the worst
antitrust offense, one would have to wonder if the Court struck the best trade off here, or whether it
threw out part of the baby with the bath water. 106
Moreover, the harm from this doctrinal tactic survives to this day. Even though Leegin has now
finally reversed Dr. Miles, the Court has not adjusted the doctrine to undo their self-confessed
manipulation of the agreement requirement in Monsanto and Sharp. Thus, in the end, the
Congressional pressure on the court in Monsanto ended up having very significant effects on antitrust
law, albeit likely not what was intended by the application of the pressure. Thus, while this is only a
single anecdote, it certainly is one that has been highly significant.
B. Pressure on the Agencies in Specific Cases
There is also the easier question of whether and how Congress and the President affect particular
antitrust actions by the agencies, as opposed to antitrust policy generally. We have the famous
examples of President Nixon attempting to stop the ITT case in exchange for campaign contributions
and President Johnson promising to get the DOJ to permit a newspaper merger in exchange for political
support. I mentioned earlier the example of President’s Reagan’s intervention in the Financial Interest
and Syndication rules and support for the Microsoft case by Senators Hatch and Metzenbaum. But,
there is an issue of how often pressure is applied and, more importantly, how often it actually succeeds
in affecting the outcome.
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Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 205 F.3d. 1028 (2000).
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While collusion may be the worse offense, exclusion may be considered the more fundamental conceptual
concern in that some type of barriers to entry and expansion is necessary for durable collusion. See Jonathan B.
Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 901 (2013).
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This is more a question for ex-AAGs and ex-Chairs of the FTC. An outsider faces difficult issues
regarding detection of the pressure or the responses by the agencies. 107 First, the subtle effect of the
AAG or FTC simply wanting to remain in the good graces of the powerful, whether it is the Congressional
committee or the President, is undetectable. 108 The recollection of the FTC being called out by the
Washington Post as the “National Nanny” remains vivid in the collective institutional memory of the
antitrust agencies. It does not take a rocket scientist to know that bringing a complaint against a large
campaign donor may generate issues for the recipients of the contributions. Second, the fact that
observations of political pressure are limited to public statements means that the incidence of political
pressure is understated. The most effective pressure does not require public pronouncements, but may
involve secret threats or promises. Third, the AAG or FTC Chair who succumbs to the pressure likely
would have a strong incentive to keep it secret to avoid being tarred as someone who can be controlled.
So, we should not expect to detect many instances of such successful public pressure, even if it occurs.
Thus, this issue is a job for real historians, not armchair ones.
One very public episode of Presidential pressure was the LTV-Republic steel merger in 1984. 109
The parties apparently discussed the merger with the White House in advance of announcing it. One

107

My comments on some of these issues are subject to an important caveat. I am an economist, not an historian
or a political scientist, and the empirical evidence on many of these issues is weak or non-existent. However, I
nonetheless hope that this discussion throws some light on the issues he raises and suggests some topics for
further study.
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Making waves and creating political problems can affect the AAG’s or FTC Chair’s future political job prospects
or damage one’s political party.
109

For a sampling of contemporary news reports, See Leslie M. Werner, “Steel Decision Called No Surprise,” New
York Times (February 27, 1984), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/17/business/steel-decision-calledno-surprise.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fF%2fFinances; New York Times,
“Optimism on Steel Tie,” (February 27, 1984), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/27/business/optimism-on-steeltie.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/F/Finances; Kenneth Noble, “Antitrust Pact Seen on Steel,”
New York Times (March 17, 1984), available at http://articles.mcall.com/1984-03-14/business/2401684_1_sheetsteel-steel-plants-second-largest-steel-producer; Robert Hershey, jr., “Approval is Given to Amended Plan for Steel
Merger,” New York Times (March 21, 1984), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/22/business/approval-is-given-to-amended-plan-for-steelmerger.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fF%2fFinances; “Steel Merger Go Ahead,”
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key, claimed defense of the merger was the constraining influence of steel imports. The DOJ was
skeptical of the import claims and blocked the initial proposal. (The joke at the time was that in the
morning, the companies explained to the Antitrust Division that foreign competition would prevent
price increases, while in the afternoon, they lobbied Congress for import quotas.)
President Reagan and his Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, both criticized the DOJ’s
decision. President Reagan was quoted as saying, “'I realize that this is a judicial matter, but I don't mind
saying that I don't believe the merger would reduce competition in the steel industry.'' 110 Secretary
Baldrige called it a “world class mistake.” 111 The Attorney General publically defended the Antitrust
Division. In the end, Republic divested two plants and the merger was permitted. I have been told by
Deborah Garza, who was a special assistant to AAG McGrath, that in light of a lack of direct
communication from the White House, the DOJ made the decision solely on the basis of the antitrust
facts. 112 In this sense, the politicians were merely making empty political statements for public
consumption.
Of course, what is possible – and undetectable – is that the pressure made a difference in
subsequent complaints brought by subsequent AAGs. For example, even if the congressional pressure
was not the cause of the termination of the FTC’s Children’s Television Advertising (Kid-Vid) rulemaking,
if the rulemaking died of its own accord, the impact of the “national nanny” label surely affected later
FTC activities. The same effects could occur from political pressure.

Pittsburgh Press (March 26, 1984), available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1144&dat=19840326&id=bOEbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=VGIEAAAAIBAJ&pg=618
0,6333992
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New York Times, Steel Merger and Reagan, (March 8, 1984), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/08/business/steel-merger-reagan-president-reagan-said-yesterday-that-hedid-not-believe-that.html
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Thomas E. Kauper, The Legacy of LTV/Republic Steel, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 753, 754 (2001)
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Personal communication.
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The steel story is just a single anecdote and the ultimate effect of the lobbying is not clear. There
have been statistical studies that attempted to quantify the impact of political pressure on FTC merger
enforcement during the Reagan administration. FTC economist Malcolm Coate and his coauthors
analyzed the statistical influence of Congressional Hearings on FTC merger outcomes during the Reagan
administration. They found that generalized Congressional pressure significantly increased the
likelihood of merger challenges during that period, though they do not identify specific cases that were
affected. 113 In a separate statistical analysis of political control over the 1993-2000 period, Coate
concludes that the President is able to set the agenda for merger control, subject to certain bounds set
by the composition of the Congress. However, the interaction is quite complex. 114 And, it is not clear
that it applied to specific cases, rather than enforcement trends generally.
The LTV/Republic matter is not unique. There have been many more recent examples of attempted
political pressure, including AT&T in its attempted merger with T-Mobile and both sides in the FTC
investigation of Google, among others. I expect that antitrust lawyers and economists generally believe
that these tactics are virtually never unsuccessful. But, if so, this raises the question of why otherwise
rational profit-maximizing firms would spend considerable sums of money on unsuccessful public
relations firms. Economists have a simple answer to this question – Prisoner’s Dilemma. The opposing
firms may be stuck at a lose-lose Nash equilibrium where both sides are making large expenditures that
essentially cancel out one another. Yet, if either side foregoes the spending, the other side will prevail.
V.

Conclusions
All in all, there is evidence that ideology and politics have a continued impact on antitrust law and

agency enforcement. Antitrust has not become a purely technocratic exercise where all the participants
113

Malcolm B. Coate et. al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 33 J. L. ECON. 463,465 (1990). A
possible criticism of the article is the assumption that the hearings were not caused by real anticompetitive
concerns. If they were, then the regression results might be biased.
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Malcolm B. Coate, A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers, 14 ECON& POLITICS 1
(2002).
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agree on the goals and the proper standards. While every AAG and FTC Chair can be said to be acting
like an umpire calling balls and strikes, they differ in their strike zones in systematic ways.
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Table 4
DOJ Civil Non-Merger Complaints: 1993-2012 115

Collusive/ Exclusionary

Section 1 or 2

Collusive (RPM)

1

1994
Microsoft Corp.
Topa Equities
Assoc. of Retail Travel Agents
Delta Dental of Arizona
Vision Service Plan
Pilkington Plc.
Nagel Motors, Inc. et. al
S.C. Johnson/ Bayer, Inc.
California SunCare, Inc.
Electronic Payment Services, Inc.
Utah Soc. for Healthcare Human Resources Admin.
Alliant Techsystems Inc./ Aerojet-General

Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary (MFN)
Exclusionary (MFN)
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive (RPM)
Exclusionary (Tying)
Collusive
Collusive/Exclusionary

1&2
1
1
1
1
1&2
1
1
1
1&2
1
1

1995
Health Choice of Northwest Missouri, Inc.
National Auto. Dealers Assoc.
American Bar Assoc.
Greyhound Lines, Inc.
HealthCare Partners, Inc.
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.
Playmobil USA, Inc.
NASDAQ

Exclusionary
Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive/Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive/Exclusionary
Exclusionary (MFN)
Collusive (RPM)
Collusive

1
1
1
1
1&2
1
1
1

1996
General Elec. Co.
City of Stilwell
Delta Dental of Rhode Island
American National Can Co./ KMK Mashinen
Brush Fibers, Inc./ A & L Mayer Associates, Inc.
Universal Shippers Assoc., Inc.

Exclusionary
Exclusionary (tying)
Exclusionary (MFN)
Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary (MFN)

1&2
1&2
1
1
1
1

1993
[Canstar Sports USA, Inc].
(not counted in totals) 116

115

Complaints are listed by Calendar Year, not Fiscal Year.

116

The 1993 Canstar Sports USA case is not included in the totals for the Clinton DOJ. The Consent Decree is dated
March 17, 1993 and AAG Ann Bingaman was not officially nominated until April 29, 1993.
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AnchorShade, Inc.
Women's Hosp. Foundation
Assoc. of Family Practice Residency Directors
Waste Management of Georgia, Inc.
Browning - Ferris Industries of Iowa, Inc.
Texas Television, Inc.
Scuba Retailers Assoc.

Collusive (RPM)
Exclusionary (MFN)
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive

1
1&2
1
2
2
1
1

Collusive
Collusive/Exclusionary

1
1

Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary (MFN)

1
1
1&2
1
1

Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive

1&2
2
1
1

Collusive

1

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive

1
1
1

2002
Mountain Health Care, P.A.
Math Works/ Wind River Systems
Nat’l Assoc. of Police Equipment Distributors, Inc.

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive

1
1
1

2003
Nat’l Council on Problem Gambling, Inc.
Village Voice Media, LLC

Collusive
Collusive

1
1

1997
Seminole Fertilizer Corp.
IBM/Storage Technology
1998
Visa U.S.A., Inc./ MasterCard
Federation of Physicians Dentists, Inc.
Microsoft Corp.
Mercury PCS II, L.L.C.
Medical Mut. of Ohio
1999
Dentsply Intern., Inc.
AMR Corp.
Federation of Certified Surgeons and Specialists, Inc.
Citadel-Triathlon JSA
2000
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
American Stock Exchange/CBOE/Pacific Exchange/Phila.
Exchange
Citadel/Capstar
FCSSI
2001
None
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2004
Eastern Mushroom Marketing Co-op., Inc.

Collusive

1

Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive

1
1
1
1

Collusive
Collusive

1
1

2007
Daily Gazette Co./ MediaNews Group
Hilton Head MLS
Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Assoc

Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive

1&2
1
1

2008
Consolidated Multiple Listing Service, Inc.

Exclusionary

1

Collusive
Exclusionary (MFN)
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive

1
1
1
1
1

Exclusionary

2

2005
National Assoc. of Realtors
Federation of Physicians and Dentists
Ecast/ NSM Music Group
Professional Consultant Insurance Co.
Bluefield Regional Med Center/ Princeton Comm. Hosp.
Assoc.
Kentucky Real Estate Commission
2006
None

2009
None
2010
American Express/Visa/MasterCard 117
Michigan BCBS
Lucasfilm/Adobe/Apple, Google/Intel/Intuit/Pixar 118
Keyspan Corp./Morgan Stanley 119
Idaho Orthopaedic Society

2011
United Regional Health Care System

117

These are counted as a single matter in the counts.

118

These are counted as a single matter in the counts.

119

The Morgan Stanley settlement occurred in 2011.
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2012
Gunnison Energy/SG Interests I, Ltd.
Apple/Book Publishers 120
eBay
Twin America 121

Collusive
Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive

120

This is counted as a single matter.

121

This was similar to a merger, but was strictly a joint venture. A complaint was issued.
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1
1
1
1

Draft: April 5, 2013
Table 5
FTC Non-Merger Complaints: 1993-2012
2012
IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.
Coopharma Pharmacy - Farmacia Cuquimar
McWane/Sigma/Star

Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive

2011
Pool Corp.
Southwest Health Alliances, Inc.

Exclusionary
Collusive

2010
Minnesota Rural Health Cooperatives
Amerco / Avis Budget Group
Transitions Optical, Inc
Boulder Valley IPA (M. Catherine Higgins)
Roaring Fork Valley Physicians, IPA, Inc.
North Carolina Dental Board

Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary

2009
Alta Bates Medical Group
MAP Policies of Musical Instrument Mfg
West Penn MLS
Watson Unimed
Intel Corporation

Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Exclusionary

2008
AllCare IPA
Boulder Valley IPA
Golf Galaxy (Dick’s Sporting Goods)
Connecticut Chiropractic Association /Congress of Chiropractic
Council
Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC 122
Cephalon, Inc.

Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary

2007
122

I have classified these “opportunism” or “hold-up” cases as exclusionary because the opportunism is often used
against competitors, as in the case of Unocal. But, the opportunism could involve a standalone patent holder as in
this matter.
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Multiple Listing Service, Inc.
Colegio de Optometras de Puerto Rico
Motor Oil Importers of Puerto Rico
Missouri State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors

Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary

2006
Advocate Health Partners
Monmouth County Association of Realtors
Realtors Association of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc.
Williamsburg Area Association of Realtors,Inc.
Northern New England Real Estate Network, Inc.
IRES MLS for Northern Colorado
New Century Health Quality Alliance, Inc.
Puerto Rico Association of Endodontists, Corp.
Austin Board of Realtors
Valassis Communications, Inc.
Health Care Alliance of Laredo, L.C.
RealComp II Ltd.
MiRealSource, Inc.

Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary

2005
Partners Health Network, Inc.
San Juan IPA
New Millennium Orthopedics LLC
Preferred Health Services
Warner Chilcott / Barr Laboratories 123

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary

2004
White Sands Health Care System, LLC
Clark County Attorneys
Southeastern New Mexico Physicians, IPA
Alpharma Inc.

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive

2003
Tenet Healthcare Corporation and Frye Regional Medical Center, Inc
Memorial Hermann Health Network
New Hampshire Motor Transport Association
South GA Health Partners (SGHP)
Surgical Specialists of Yakima

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive

123

These non-compete agreements are treated as exclusionary.
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The Iowa Movers and Warehouseman's Assn
Minnesota Transport Services Association
Physician Networks Consulting
Maine Health Alliance
Washington University Physician Network
Southwest Physician Associates
Anesthesia Service Medical Gro
Carlsbad Physician Association
The Institute of Store Planner
Indiana Household Movers and Warehousemen
BMS (Buspar; Cisplatin; Taxol) 124
Piedmont Health Alliance
North Texas Specialty Physicians
South Carolina State Board of Dentistry
Movers Conference of Mississippi
Alabama Trucking Association
Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Association, Inc.
California Pacific Medical Group
Union Oil of California

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary

2002
Natl. Academy of Arbitrators
Amer. Inst. for Conservation
System Health Providers
Professionals in Women's Care
Biovail / Elan (Generic Adalat CC)
Physician Integrated Systems
Aurora Assn. Primary Care Phys
Biovail / Tiazac
Napa County OB/Gyns
Rambus, Inc.

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary

2001
Polygram Holding Inc. (The Three Tenors)

Collusive

2000
Schering-Plough / Upsher Smith 125

Exclusionary

124

These were 3 separate but related complaints.
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MCC Manufacturers
Alaska Healthcare Network
MAP Policies of Prerecorded
Texas Surgeons
Colegio de Cirujanos Dentistas de PR
Abbott / Invamed
McCormick Spices
WI Chiropractic Assn
Nine West Group Inc
Andrx-Hoechst Generic Cardizem

Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive (RPM)
Exclusionary

1999
Southern Valley Pool Assn.
Tahoe Health System

Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive

1998
Asociacion de Farmacias Region
Columbia River Pilots Assn
Dentists of Juana Diaz, Coamo,
Chrysler Dealers, Unn
South Lake Tahoe Lodging Asso
M.D. Physicians of Southwest LA Inc
Institutional Pharmacy Network
Fastline Publications, Inc.
Great Lakes Chemical Corporation
Container Board Mfrs
Sensormatic
Urological Stone Surgeons, Inc
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Intel Corp
Summit Technology

Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive (RPM)
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive

1997
American Cyanamid
College of Physicians
Mesa County Physicians, IPA

Collusive (RPM)
Collusive
Collusive

1996
MT Associated Physicians
Hale and Waterous

Collusive/Exclusionary
Exclusionary

125

The complaint was filed in April 2001, but while Robert Pitofsky was still Chair. Therefore, I have counted it as a
Clinton case and placed in this list under 2000 for convenience.
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New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc.
Precision Moulding
RxCare
Toys "R" Us, Inc.

Collusive (RPM)
Collusive
Collus/Exclusion(MFN)
Exclusionary

1995
Dell Computer Inc
New England Juvenile Retailers
Baby Furniture Plus
Medical Staff of Good Samaritan
Del Monte Foods Company
La Asociacion Medica De Puerto Rico
Korean Video Store Ass'n of Maryland
Reebok
Physicians Group
The Council of Fashion Designers of America
Summit Communication Group
Port Washington Real Estate Board, Inc.
Federal News Service Group, Inc.
Reuters America Inc.
Santa Clara County Motor Car Dealers Association

Exclusionary
Collusive/Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive/Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive (RPM)
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary

1994
Arizona Automobile Dealers Assoc
Community Associations Institute
Keds Corp.
McLean County Chiropractic Assoc
Personal Protective Armor Assoc
American Association of Language Specialists
American Society of Interpreters
Boulder Ridge Cable TV
Certain Home Oxygen/Home Oxygen
Homecare Oxygen & Medical Equipment Company
Trauma Associates of North Broward, Inc.
International Association of Conference Interpreters

Collusive
Collusive
Collusive (RPM)
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive

1993
AE Clevite
American Industrial Real Estate Assoc.
Assoc. of Soil & Foundation Engineers (ASFE)
B&J School Bus Services Inc.
Baltimore Metropolitan Pharmaceutical Assoc, Inc.

Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
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National Assoc of Social Workers
Southeast Colorado Pharmacal Assoc
United Real Estate Brokers of Rockland, Ltd
YKK (U.S.A)
California Dental Association
Nat’l Assoc of Prof Engineers

Collusive
Collusive
Exclusionary
Collusive
Collusive
Collusive
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